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A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
OF 1969
STEVEN B. FISHMAN*
Lead the people by regulations, keep them in order by punishments
(hsing), and they will flee from you and lose all self-respect. But lead
them by virtue and keep them in order by established morality (li), and
they will keep their self-respect and come to you. Confucius, ANALECTS,
II, 3.
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19691 (NEPA) has,
perhaps more than any other recent federal legislation, been the sub-
ject of intense discussion and furious speculation, both in legal and
nonlegal literature.2 It has been hailed as an "environmental bill of
rights" 3 and criticized as a foppishly romantic waste of time and
* B.S., University of California (Irvine), 1969; J.D., Washington University,
1972.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 et seq. (1970).
2. See Coleman, Possible Repercussion of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 on the Private Law Governing Pollution Abatement Suits, 3 NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW. 647 (1970); Donovan, The Federal Government and Environmen-
tal Control: Administrative Reform on the Executive Level, 12 B.C. IND. & COB.
L. Rnv. 541 (1971); Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Cit-
izen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REv.
230 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hanks & Hanks]; Hazelton, Public Policy for Con-
trolling the Environment, 48 J. URBAN L. 631 (1971); Jackson, Environmental
Policy and the Congress, 11 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 403 (1971); Reilly, The
National Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Highway Program: Merging
Administration Traffic, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. Rav. 211 (1970); Yannacone, National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ENv. LAw. 8 (1970); Yost, Implementing the
National Environmental Policy Act, 3 Sw. U.L. Rav. 88 (1971); Note, The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing?, 37 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 139 (1970); Note, Retroactive Application of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HASTINGS,
Retroactive Application]; Note, A Panoramic View of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 16 How. L.J. 116 (1970); Note, Retroactive Application of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 69 MICH. L. Rav. 732 (1971); Note,
NEPA: Full of Sound and Fury . .. ?, 6 U. RICHM On D L. Rav. 116 (1971);
Comment, 50 B.U.L. Rav. 616 (1970). See also Lindsay, Conversation with Brit-
ain's Environmental Chief, 55 SATURDAY REV. 64 (Jan. 1, 1972).
3. See Hanks & Hanks, supra note 2.
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energy.4 The Act has already taken its place in the daily language of
environmentalists and the general public with its acronym, NEPA.
One commentator has suggested that NEPA's significance and impact
is pervasive enough to have a salutary effect on environmentally re-
lated legislation by reinforcing their environment-protecting provi-
sions,5 while other writers take narrower views on NEPA's impact.0
Much of the published material concerning NEPA, its potentials and
its limitations, must be considered in the perspective in which the
commentators have perceived NEPA's goals and purposes. Also,
much of the literature which had been flooding the legal periodicals,
was due to an immediate reaction to the passage of the bill. Disre-
garding for the moment the effect NEPA has had on "environmental
quality," i.e., whether or not and to what extent NEPA has accom-
plished its "goals" (or more precisely, whether the "goals" of NEPA
have been properly reached and its "mandate" implemented), the
great abundance of energetic treatment which NEPA has received
from the very outset, prior to the existence of any reasonable body of
case law, can be explained by the national awareness of environmen-
tal problems coupled with the dissimilarity of other environmental
legislation and the distinctly "new" approach that Congress sought to
take toward solution.
Whatever differences commentators had regarding the substance of
NEPA, they all agreed that NEPA was something different. Senator
Jackson, the Act's sponsor and leading proponent, recently made this
point evident when he stated that
A national policy for the environment was necessary to provide
both a conceptual basis and legal sanction for applying to en-
vironmental management the methods of systems analysis that
have demonstrated their value in universities, private enterprise,
and in some areas of government.7
Certainly there was a large desire among the "professions" to explore
and test the limits of this legislatively imposed attempt at a rational
decision-making policy.
4. See generally J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEOY FOR
CITIZEN ACTION (1971).
5. HAsTINGs, Retroactive Application at 809. See also S. REP. No. 296, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969).
6. See, e.g., NEPA: Full of Sound and Fury ... ?, supra note 2, at 116.
7. Jackson, supra note 2, at 407.
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The first obstacle that the writers saw as a block to agency imple-
mentation of NEPA was the "retroactive application" issue.8 If
NEPA was to serve as the basis for a new approach to the environ-
ment, it would be necessary to overcome the common complaint set
forth by the agencies that NEPA would frustrate much of their on-
going activities. The agencies saw NEPA as a "from this point on"
piece of legislation and couched their views on limitations in terms of
fair play and economy. It is not surprising, then, that the writers
would argue that NEPA's full potential (legislation mandating pre-
ventive action rather than the pre-NEPA corrective-type legislation)
could only be realized if NEPA was applied to all current agency ac-
tion, disregarding both the ecologically irrelevant dates of agency
decision and legislative allocations of funds.9
The first cases to be decided under NEPA were primarily con-
cerned with retroactivity. Early cases approached the issue from the
standpoint of legislative intent,' with the thrust of their holdings
based upon a judicial determination that Congress intended only
prospective application." Eventually, however, the judicial trend has
been in the direction of acceptance of NEPA as retroactively applica-
ble,'- or at least in the nature of a retroactively applicable statute.-
The attitude of the courts toward NEPA was beginning to take form
in these cases and was manifested by the oft-employed uses of judicial
gymnastics surrounding a holding of retroactivity.14
8. See, e.g., HASTINGS, Retroactive Application, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. See Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238
(M.D. Pa. 1970); aff'd, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971). But see Environmental
Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.
1972), where the court, referring to Bartlett stated: "None of these opinions
analyze NEPA to determine whether the theory has any merit beyond noting the
absence of language requiring retrospective application." Id. at 811-12.
11. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. Volpe, 329 F.
Supp. 118 (W.D. Wash. 1970); Elliot v. Volpe, 328 F. Supp. 831 (D. Mass.
1971); Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore.
1970); Bucklein v. Volpe, 2 ERG 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
12. See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
13. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
14. See Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Ga.
1971).
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Perhaps it was this early favorable response by the courts which
prompted new theories with regard to NEPA's potential. Emerging
as a private vehicle for limiting federal and federal-state action,
writers began assessing NEPA's impact on the law of standing.', One
commentator pointed out that although NEPA was not specifically
designed to facilitate judicial review, it should accomplish precisely
that objective since it provides a clear basis for asserting standing by
private environmental groups.16 Moreover, one author has quite op-
timistically observed that
[i]n the past, we have often accepted the non sequitur that where
all are intended beneficiaries of an interest, none has standing to
protect it. The dangers inherent in this philosophy are now ap-
parent: Both logic and experience support the emerging view
that an interest so fundamental that all are within the protected
class must be permitted its champion. The National Environ-
mental Policy Act has created such an interest.17
Generally, the courts have been quick to agree that the Act itself is a
sufficient basis for alleging standing to litigate's under a provision of
NEPA.
Throughout the literature, 9 there have been attempts to imply a
substantive cause of action from section 101 of NEPA. One extremely
thorough treatment20 of this possibility frankly recognizes that on the
face of NEPA there is no indication that the Act was intended to be
self-executing. Indeed, one commentator has flatly stated that "[t]he
legislative history in this regard is ambiguous; one can only say that
such a possibility was thought of and not categorically rejected."21
15. See generally Hanks & Hanks, supra note 2; The National Environmental
Policy Act: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?, supra note 2, at 139; NEPA: Full of
Sound and Fury . .. .?, supra note 2, at 116. See also ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Div., 9 1ST CONG., 1ST SEss., CONGRESS AND THE NATION'S ENVIRONMENT, EN-
VIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS OF THE 91ST CONGRESS (Comm. Print 1971).
16. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: A Sheep in Wolf's Cloth-
ing?, supra note 2, at 154. For a general discussion of this type of standing, see
Note, Non-Statutory Review of Federal Administrative Action, 68 Micir. L. REv.
387 (1970).
17. Hanks & Hanks at 248.
18. But see McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971) which held
that there was no standing to invoke federal jurisdiction under NEPA.
19. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 2, at 647. See also Note, Implying Civil
Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HAav. L. REV. 285 (1963).
20. Coleman, supra note 2.
21. Id. at 655.
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Although cogent arguments have been proffered in support of imply-
ing a cause of action, courts have universally rejected any attempt to
do so. One court has stated that "[t]he Act appears to reflect a com-
promise which . . . falls short of creating the type of 'substantive
rights' claimed by the plaintiffs. Apparently the sponsors could ob-
tain agreement only upon an Act which declared the national en-
vironmental policy. This represents a giant step, but just a step." 22
Herein seem to lie the limits that courts were willing to allow for the
implementation of NEPA: plaintiffs must be relegated to enforce-
ment of the procedural requirements23 of the Act.
Now that the basic questions first presented in the early cases have
been answered and generally accepted, courts and litigants have
turned their efforts toward more subtle and sophisticated questions
involving agency implementation of the Act. There is now a fairly
explicit body of case law defining to what extent, and in what man-
ner, agencies must consider environmental factors in their decision-
making process. Federal agencies have been instructed 24 to adopt
procedures for the orderly compliance with NEPA's procedural re-
quirements under section 102.25 All agencies have thus far promul-
22. 325 F. Supp. at 755. See also Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d
603 (10th Cir. 1971); Bucklein v. Volpe, 2 ERC 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4322(2)(C) (1970).
24. Exec. Order No. 11,514 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 105 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1970) in part, orders agencies to: "Develop procedures to ensure the fullest
practicable provision of timely public information and understanding of Federal
plans and programs ith environmental impact in order to obtain the views of
interested parties. These procedures shall include, whenever appropriate, provision
for public hearings, and shall provide the public with relevant information, includ-
ing information on alternative courses of action."
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970): Cooperation of Agencies; reports; availability of
information; recommendations; international and national coordination of efforts.
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and
administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2) all
agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the inte-
grated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in
planning and in decision-making which may have an impact on man's environ-
ment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the
Council on Environmental Quality established by Title II of this Act, which will
insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be
given appropriate consideration in decision-making along with economic and tech-
nical considerations;
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gated regulations,1 or at least are operating with them in draft
form.2 7 Nevertheless, there is a steady increase in the quantity of "102
Suits" 28 brought by conservation groups and private citizens against
federal agencies seeking preliminary injunctions in order to halt the
commencement or continuation of federal projects. On the surface,
the increase in the number of such suits may suggest that agency com-
pliance with NEPA is all but satisfactory. But, whatever appeal there
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to
making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with
and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of
such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State,
and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental
standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental
Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, United States
Code, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review
processes;
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning
alternative uses of available resources;
(E) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental prob-
lems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend ap-
propriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize
international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of
mankind's world environment;
(F) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and indi-
viduals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing
the quality of the environment;
(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and develop-
ment of resource-oriented projects; and
(H) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by Title II of
this Act.
26. See, e.g., Dep't of Transportation (DOT) Procedures, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,679
(1971). See also notes 116-123 infra and accompanying text.
27. See Appendix, Hearings on Administration of the National Environmental
Policy Act Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91, pt.
2, at 357 (1970).
28. The reported cases are increasing in volume weekly. See ERC, vols. 1-3.
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may be for the acceptance of this quantitative factor as an accurate
indicator of agency implementation, there are other significant factors
at play which are too subjective in nature to accurately assess.
One factor which certainly must play a role in increased litigation
is the phenomenal growth of the public's awareness of its environ-
ment coupled with a growing trend to "do something about it." Ease
of access to the courts -  provides a visible route toward these ends. A
corollary to this marked tendency to "go to court" is the willingness
of courts to provide the relief sought.
Another extremely important factor which must be considered is
the attitude of the agencies themselves. Agencies may honestly be-
lieve that they are complying with the mandate of NEPA, i.e., they
are "doing their best." Furthermore, agencies may regard NEPA as
only a minor procedural requirement and not as a departure from
their previous authority to consider environmental impact in the
decision-making process. This, for example, is the "official" position
of the Department of Transportation.30 It would seem, therefore,
that the question of whether or not NEPA is sufficiently progressing
along the lines that Congress intended cannot be answered solely by
a cursory headcount of "102 suits."
Approaching the question from a different point of view, a careful
examination of reported cases reveals agency attitudes; attitudes which
set the background for either concerted obstructionism or implemen-
tation. Additionally, agencies' self-promulgated procedures are strong
indicators of their attitudes; but, probably more revealing than any
other specific indicator is the scope and depth of their section 102
environmental impact statements.31 Courts have played a major role
29. See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
30. Statement of James D. Braman in Hearings on the National Environmental
Policy Act Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1970). [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Public
Works.] DOT regards NEPA as no major change in policy from DOT Act of
1966, 23 U.S.C. §§ 2(b)(2), 4(f) (1970).
31. If we assume, as we must, that agency administrators are not inherently
"evil," that is to say not diabolically opposed to environmental quality at any cost,
then it would seem that a complete and thorough analysis of environmental im-
pact, prior to any final action taken, must weigh somewhere in the decision-making
process. Proper section 102 statements are indicators only of agency attitude re-
garding the Act. The "rightness" or "wrongness" of the decision is not questioned
and should play no part in determining attitudes toward NEPA. See also Hearings
on Public Works, supra note 30.
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in defining the scope of federal agencies' duties under section 102.
For this reason, it is fruitless to question the extent of agency com-
pliance without first examining what constitutes compliance.
II. Tm NATURE OF THE POLICY AcT
In order to survey the scope of agency compliance with the national
,policy set down by Congress in NEPA, it will be useful to discuss the
nature of this policy. For without a dear and well-defined under-
standing of what is to be expected, courts, agencies and the public
will be hard-pressed to ascertain whether or not NEPA has been suc-
cessful. The stated purpose of NEPA is to "declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between
man and his environment . ... 32 Congress declared that "it is the
continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use all practica-
ble means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to foster and
promote the general welfare ... of present and future generations of
Americans." 33 To this end the government must "coordinate Federal
plans, functions, programs, and resources . . . ."3 Following the en-
actment of NEPA, President Nixon ordered federal agencies to
"initiate measures needed to direct their policies, plans and programs
so as to meet national environmental goals." 3 In this same light,
agencies have developed procedures,36 such as those promulgated by
the Federal Highway Administration, "to assure that the human
environment is carefully considered and national environmental goals
are met when developing federally financed [projects] .... 37
There appears to be much confusion concerning the distinction be-
tween policy and goals, especially in the attempts by the executive
branch to implement NEPA. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia recognized this dichotomy in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating
Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission,;- stating that "Congress
did not establish environmental protection as an exclusive goal;
rather, it desired a reordering of priorities so that environmental costs
32. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
33. Id. § 4331(a).
34. Id. § 4331(b).
35. Exec. Order No. 11,514 § 1, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1970).
36. See notes 116-23 infra and accompanying text.
37. 36 Fed. Reg. 23,696 (1971).
38. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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and benefits will assume their proper place along with other consid-
erations." * Senator Jackson has observed that goals are "man"
oriented while most federal resource policies are "object" oriented.40
For this reason, it is crucial not to confuse broad environmental pol-
icy with the narrower, single purpose efforts characteristic of the goals
upon which previous environmental legislation has focused.
Despite NEPA's attempt at a broad environmental policy, there
is substantial reason to believe NEPA falls far short of that policy.
Professor Grad has pointed out that the most striking aspect of en-
ironmental controls is the absence of any broadly inclusive federal
policy."1 NEPA was superimposed, Professor Grad suggests, on an
already existing scheme of environmental control which is both incon-
sistent and bewildering.42 NEPA
expresses a general policy in favor of the preservation and resto-
ration of the environment without, however, reaching in to adjust
existing intergovernmental relations and without seeking to or-
der the variety of regulatory efforts at different levels of govern-
ment in any systematic way.4 3
If NEPA is not a viable national policy, it is certainly a step toward
one. The goals expressed in NEPA, however, are too ill-defined to
suggest reconciliation with other national policies. 44 This notion may
further be explained by recognizing that "[tfhe tendencies of con-
temporary American society to inordinate and uncontrolled growth
39. Id. at 1112.
40. See generally Jackson, supra note 2, at 408.
41. F. GRA-D, Inter-Governmental Aspects of Environmental Controls, in EN-
VIRONMENTAL CONTROL: PRIORITIES, POLICIES, AND THE LAW 47 (1971).
42. Id. at 48.
43. Id. But consider the effect that the recently created Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) might have concerning the ideas expressed herein. Professor
Grad recognized that the creation of EPA is the first step "in sorting-out of the
present legal and administrative relationships." Id.
44. See generally Hazelton, supra note 2, at 631. "NEPA commits the nation to
goals which may prove contradictory without any indication of how such contra-
dictions are to be resolved. Thus, the Act requires the Federal Government to use
all practicable means to achieve the nation's environmental goals, but adds these
means must be 'consistent with other essential considerations of national policy.' "
Id. at 651. But see HASTINGs, Retroactive Application at 827, which states that
it may be consistent with NEPA to have economic factors override environmental
considerations and objectives.
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are fundamentally incompatible with the objectives of the environ-
mental quality movement ..... ,45
Yet, if NEPA did not emerge as the far-reaching, curative policy
act that its sponsors intended, that should come as no surprise. Pol-
icy, in general, Professor Henning has observed, is a reflection of the
culture where it operates.46 In American society, pragmatic and
pluralistic characteristics are dominant in general policy areas. "At
present the political climate and changing conditions do not appear
to give much stability and authority to policy in general." 47 What,
then, is the extent of the policy expressed in NEPA? Professor Grad
suggests that NEPA can help reconcile federal programs with broad
environmental implications through federal regulatory efforts; no
sustained federal environmental policy can emerge without this co-
ordinated effort. 48
The courts, too, have perceived the extent of policy expressed in
NEPA in varying manners. In Zabel v. Tabb 49 an action by land-
owners to compel the Secretary of the Army to issue a permit to
dredge and fill navigable waters of a bay, the court failed to articulate
its reasoning process from the standpoint of policy consideration, but
stated that where NEPA is "considered together with the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act and its interpretation, there is no doubt
that the Secretary can refuse, on conservation grounds, a permit
under the Rivers and Harbors Act."50 In Greene County v. Federal
Power Commission,51 the court viewed NEPA as "going far beyond
the requirement that the agency merely consider environmental fac.
tors .... It is a mandate to consider environmental values at every
distinctive and comprehensive stage of the [agency's] process."5 2 From
a widely different perspective, the court in Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers,53 considered NEPA as, at the very least,
45. Caldwell, Environmental Policy in a Hypertrophic Society, 11 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 417 (1971).
46. Henning, Environmental Policy and Politics: Value and Power Context, 11
NATURAL.ESOURCE S J. 447, 452 (1971).
47. Id.
48. F. GRAD, supra note 41.
49. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
50. Id. at 214.
51. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972).
52. Id. at 420, citing Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
53. 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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an environmental full disclosure law which was "certainly intended
to make . . . decision-making more responsive and more responsi-
ble." 4 The manner in which these courts discern the national en-
vironmental policy is undoubtedly the key element figuring in what
courts will procedurally require of the agencies which are subject to
that policy.-
Whatever the defects of NEPA may be in terms of ill-defined policy
considerations, the reality of the situation must not be obscured: fed-
eral agencies must nevertheless function within the limits of NEPA
as it has been enacted and interpreted. In recognizing these limita-
tions, the residual effects of NEPA's drawbacks are now becoming
evident. One commentator has indicated that "[i]n the absence of a
defined . . . policy, there is no way to evaluate any administrative
structure or function, even by means of the sterile criteria of econ-
omy and efficiency."- And, from the perspective of agency attempts
to cope with court-enforced section 102 procedures, Professor Sax has
observed that "when problems .. are presented in a diffuse and un-
focused way, as by asking someone to consider all the factors involved
in any proposal, the problems are so open-ended as almost to defy
resolution."?
The frustrated position that many agencies must find themselves in
is further illustrated by an examination of the "open-ended" require-
ments set out in the language of the Act. Section 102 (2) (C) pro-
vides that "all agencies . . . shall . . . include in every report . . . a
detailed statement . . . [of] alternatives to the proposed action."' IS
The majority of courts have required agencies to take positive efforts
in discussing options in their environmental impact statements and
to consider them in their decision-making process.5 9 Yet, most agen-
cies are severely limited by law or budgetary allowances from imple-
menting any option which would accomplish similar objectives with
54. Id. at 759.
55. See note 195 infra and accompanying text. See also Reilly, supra note 2,
at 211.
56. CALDWELL, Authority and Responsibility for Environmental Administration,
in THE PoLrrcs OF NEGLECT 229, 231 (R. Meek & J. Straayer eds. 1971).
57. J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION
91 (1971).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
59. See, e.g., 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971). See also note 160 infra and
accompanying text.
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less drastic environmental impact.60 Without the power to effectuate
desired ends through environmentally safer means, all agency action
will pull toward the status quo. NEPA, through its disarming shot-
gun approach, makes no attempt to resolve this administrative quag-
mire. Without a true policy and without coordination in the execu-
tive branch, the thrust of NEPA is embodied in its procedural
requirements. An agency need only prepare a carefully tailored sec-
tion 102 statement to comply with the Act. The paradoxical result,
as Professor Grad has observed, may be to protect "the agencies from
the environmentalists, rather than the environment from the
agencies."81
In sharp contrast to America's environmental policy stands the
"total approach" taken by England's Department of the Environ-
ment. 2 Each section of the country, explains Department Head Peter
Walker, has a dear regional planning strategy,6 3 the result being
more effective handling of environmental problems. For example, in
the recent London Airport siting, the Department was able to reverse
the decision of a high-level commission. 64 Mr. Walker reports that
the Department "was able to look at the total environmental impact
-.. [and] was able to bring a total approach to a particular prob.
lem."65 England has rejected the procedural modes embraced by
NEPA for a public watchdog approach. Says Mr. Walker: "[t]here
is no British equivalent to your environmental impact statement, nor
do I intend to have one. I personally think it is the duty of any gov-
ernment department to pursue high-quality decisions in terms of the
environment and they should be severely, publicly chastised if they
don't."66
However suggestive England's solution might seem, a complete
system of federal environmental controls runs headlong into funda-
mental constitutional problems, consideration of which is beyond the
scope of this note. Mention is made of England's "total approach"
60. See Reilly, supra note 2, at 211.
61. F. GRAD, supra note 41, at 172.
62. The Department of the Environment, created in 1970, has the largest staff
and the highest budget of Britain's cabinet level departments.
63. Lindsay, supra note 2, at 64.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 70.
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simply as a point of contrast to emphasize NEPA's failings and to
suggest that any effective environmental policy must be grounded in
sufficient statutory and financial power. NEPA and its section 102
statement, "like a number of other decisions in the past, readily
makes a land fit for lawyers to live in with no great impact upon the
environment itself."67
I1. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF NEPA's PROCEDURAL MANDATES
In section 102 of NEPA, Congress directed that "to the fullest ex-
tent possible" all agencies of the federal government shall comply
with the section 102 procedural requirements.68 There is no doubt
that the phrase, "to the fullest extent possible," does not render
NEPA discretionary. On the contrary, all the circuit courts which
have interpreted this phrase have recognized that this requirement
sets a high standard for the agencies.19 "[T]he words are an injunc-
tion to all federal agencies to exert utmost efforts to apply NEPA to
their own operations."70 In Calvert Cliffs,71 the court held that sec-
tion 102 duties are not inherently flexible and must be complied with
to the fullest extent, unless there exists a clear statutory conflict of
authority.7= "Considerations of administrative difficulty, delay or
economic cost will not suffice to strip the section of its fundamental
importance."73 Earlier courts, 74 however, have used language stressing
discretionary aspects of the Act. Calvert Cliffs sought to distinguish
these cases on the grounds that those courts were referring to NEPA's
substantive goals, (section 101) rather than the procedural duties
created under section 102.75
In spite of the broad reading courts have given to the extent of
section 102 applicability, recent cases have limited, to some extent,
67. Id.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
69. See, e.g., 449 F.2d at 1113.
70. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971).
71. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
72. Id. at 1115.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Pennsylvania En-
vironmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Bucklein v.
Volpe, 2 ERG 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
75. 449 F.2d at 1115 & n.13.
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
its scope. As some commentators have suggested, "the existence of a
review, control or planning function in the agency raises a presump-
tion for the applicability of the Act.""7 In Cohen v. Price Commis.
sion,7 the court held that the Price Commission created by the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act need not file an environmental impact
statement before authorizing increases in subway and bus fares merely
because fare increases could conceivably result in an acceleration of
air pollution due to a substantial increase in motor vehicle traffic.
The court reasoned that the Price Commission was a temporary
agency "whose function would readily be frustrated by bureaucratic
delays were it required to ... [evaluate] environmental benefits or
detriments that may be involved in its determination of price and
wages."78 The decision in Cohen seems to be grounded in the contrast
between long-range environmental policy and short-term economic
policy. Whatever broad implications Cohen may have had on NEPA's
applicability were wisely avoided by its narrow holding.
In cases where the agency did not file a section 102 statement,"0
most courts have had no problem enjoining agency action provided it
was a "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment" 8 0 as required by section 102. Courts have been
split, however, in granting preliminary injunctions to plaintiffs who
allege defects in the agency's impact statements. There are those
courts which have adopted an attitude that "general policy compli-
ance" is sufficient for NEPA's section 102 requirements even though
there may be substantive defects in the impact statement. 8 Other
courts have approached the problem from the point of view that
nothing less than "strict compliance" is sufficient.82
In Daly v. Volpe,8 3 the court denied plantiffs a preliminary injunc-
76. Hanks & Hanks, supra note 2, at 265.
77. 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
78. Id. at 1241.
79. See, e.g., Cathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Izaak Walton
League v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970). Concerning judicial interpretation of
this statutory language, see text accompanying note 138 infra.
81. See, e.g., Daly v. Volpe, 326 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wash. 1971); Sierra
Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971); Sanguine v. Laird, 217 F.
Supp. 664 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
82. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs,
325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
83. 326 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wash. 1971).
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tion upon a showing by the agency that extensive correspondence,
consultation, meetings and hearings were held on the location of an
interstate highway, despite the fact that a draft impact statement was
not filed prior to the third corridor hearing; hence, comments thereon
were not part of the decision-making process as contemplated by
NEPA and its implementing regulations.8 4 The court reasoned that
"there has been substantial compliance with the policies underlying
NEPA and its implementing regulations .. .[thus] the objectives of
NEPA have been achieved .. .."85 Similarly, the court in Sierra Club
v. Hardin,3' refused to enjoin the Forest Service from completing a
sale of timber in a national forest although its hastily compiled im-
pact statement did not comply with the Council on Environmental
Quality's guidelines. The court narrowed its holding to the particu-
lar facts of the case and relied on the following: extensive environ-
mental considerations by a panel of experts, "the high quality of its
research product, the advance stage of planning [as of NEPA's effec-
tive date of application] ...and the exorbitant cost of any further
delay ...... .These cases suggest that as long as an agency can affir-
matively indicate that environmental considerations were major inputs
into the decision-making process, the spirit of NEPA has not been
frustrated. Furthermore, NEPA's procedural requirements should
be followed, if at all possible, since a bad faith circumvention of the
procedural requirements is contrary to NEPA's policy.
On the other hand, however, the majority of courts have held that
bona fide efforts to consider environmental impact without strict
compliance with section 102 "should not inhibit the objective and
thorough evaluation of the environmental impact of the project as
required by NEPA."s In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
84. Id. at 870. ". . . DOT issued interim regulations ... implementing section
102(2) (C) of NEPA. These regulations provided that an environmental state-
ment 'be prepared at the earliest practicable point in time ... so that the analysis
of environmental effects and the exploration of alternatives 'with respect thereto
are significant impacts to the decision-making process.'" Id. Furthermore, there
was no compliance with Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Interim
Guidelines which require that draft environmental statements be circulated for
comment to all interested federal agencies.
85. Id.
86. 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971).
87. Id. at 127.
88. 325 F. Supp. at 746.
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Engineers,89 the court enjoined the completion of the Gilham Dam
project on grounds that the impact statement filed by the Corps of
Engineers was deficient in several respects. Plaintiffs contended that
the statement reached erroneous conclusions, paid inadequate atten-
tion to certain matters and no attention at all to other important
factors.90 The court agreed, but went one step further by setting
down minimum procedural requirements insofar as new projects are
concerned. 91 According to the court, the primary procedural mini-
mum requires an agency to utilize a systematic interdisciplinary
approach in planning and decision-making by setting forth all en-
vironmental impacts which are known to the agency.02 In addition,
the court in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg?3 held
that the agency must set out all adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided.94 Finally, the Seaborg court held that the agency
must consult with, and obtain comments from, all federal agencies
which have jurisdiction by law or expertise.95 With respect to pro-
cedures to be followed for environmental impact consideration of
ongoing projects, one court has suggested that so long as the detailed
statement requirements are complied with, any reasonable procedure
may be adequate,
It is apparent that simply requiring agencies to compile thorough
and detailed statements, without something more, may possibly result
89. 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
90. Id. at 746.
91. Id. See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), where the court issued a preliminary in-
junction upon further construction of the Tellies Dam project on the grounds that
"the draft statement's cost-benefit analysis consist[ed] almost entirely of unsup-
ported conclusions." Id. at 809.
92. 325 F. Supp. at 758. See generally Committee for Nuclear Responsibility
v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which states that ". . . the court has
a responsibility to determine whether the agencies involved have fully and in good
faith followed the procedure contemplated by Congress: that is, setting forth the
environmental factors involved in order that those entrusted with ultimate deter-
mination whether to authorize, abandon or modify the project, shall be clearly
advised of the environmental factors which they must take into account." Id. at
787.
93. Id. at 783.
94. Id.
95. Id. "Only responsible opposing views need be included and hence there is
room for discretion on the part of the oficials preparing the statement; but there
is no room for an assumption that their determination is conclusive." Id. at 787.
96. 325 F. Supp. at 757.
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in agency frustration of the national policy. This is precisely the
situation presented in Calvert Cliffs. Atomic Energy Commission
regulations provide that an applicant for an initial construction
permit must submit to the Commission his own "environmental re-
port."' 7 A new report must then be submitted at the time of applica-
tion for an operating permit, noting any factors which have changed
since the initial report. At each stage the Commission must take the
applicant's report and compile its own detailed statement which is
then circulated for comment to other agencies93 Furthermore, the
regulations state that:
when no party to a proceeding . . . raises any [environmental
issuel . . . such issues will not be considered . . . although the
applicant's Environmental Report, comments thereon, and the
Detailed Statement will accompany the application through the
review processes, they will not be received in evidence, and the
Commission's responsibilities under [NEPA] will be carried out
in toto outside the hearing process.99
The court held these procedures to be wholly inadequate inasmuch
as the word "accompany," in section 102 (2) (C), does not merely
suggest a requirement of physical proximity, but must "be read to
indicate a congressional intent that environmental factors, as com-
piled in the 'detailed statement,' be considered through agency review
processes.""',' The court met AEC's argument that economic reasons
are the bases for limiting environmental issues to hearings in which
parties affirmatively raise those issues, by observing that it is "un-
realistic to assume that there will always be an intervenor with the
information, energy and money required to challenge a staff recom-
mendation which ignores environmental costs."'1o0
97. AEC Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 50.1 (1971).
98. Id. Concerning the propriety of these regulations, see notes 171-76, infra
and accompanying text.
99. 10 C.F.R. § 50.1 (1971).
100. 449 F.2d at 1117-18.
Compliance to the "fullest" possible extent would seem to demand that en-
vironmental issues be considered at every important stage in the decision-
making process concerning a particular action-at every stage where an
overall balancing of environmental and nonenvironmental factors is appro-
priate and where alterations might be made in the proposed action to mini-
mize environmental costs.
Id.
101. Id. at 1118-19.
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The effect of Calvert Cliffs, and cases accepting its rationale, 02 is
two-fold: first, agencies have the duty to affirmatively compile and
report, to the fullest extent possible, all factors which may have any
effect on the human environment; and, second, to consider this infor-
mation wherever and whenever it may possibly affect the outcome of
that agency decision.103
To insure that the Calvert Cliffs requirements are genuinely effec-
tuated, courts have generally been very demanding as to where and
from whom the agencies obtain their environmental information.
Section 102 does not speak directly to this point, providing only that
"[p]rior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal
official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect
to any environmental impact involved."104 The least complicated
situation was presented in Greene County, where the Federal Power
Commission substituted the environmental statement of an applicant
for its own. The court rejected this procedure, 05 citing the language
of Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Corn.
missionos that "the Commission has claimed to be the representative
of the public interest. This role does not permit it to act as an um-
pire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before
it; the right of the public must receive active and affirmative protec-
tion at the hands of the Commission."' 07 Similarly, in Goose Hollow
v. Romney,108 HUD filed a "negative statement" indicating no en-
102. See, e.g., Greene County v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d
Cir. 1972); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
103. The court, in Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971), in dictum,
articulated the rationale underlying the duties of agencies expressed in Calvert
Cliffs, stating:
[A] federal agency obligated to take into account the values... NEPA seek[s)
to safeguard, may not evade that obligation by keeping its thought processes
under wraps. Discretion to decide does not include a right to act perfunc-
torily or arbitrarily. . . . The agency must not only observe the prescribed
procedural requirements and actually take account of the factors specified,
but it must also make a sufficiently detailed disclosure so that in the event
of a later challenge to the agency's procedure, the courts will not be left to
guess whether the requirements of . . . NEPA have been obeyed.
Id. at 1138.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1970).
105. 455 F.2d at 420.
106. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
107. Id. at 620.
108. 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
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vironmental impact statement was necessary, solely on the basis of an
applicant's preliminary environmental worksheet. 0 9 The court re-
jected the "negative statement" because HUD, not the applicants,
had "overall responsibility for the proposal federal action."11°
In a like manner, certain courts have shown a willingness to strike
down agency regulations which give complete deference to an-
other agency with respect to specific environmental considerations."1 "
In Kalur v. Resor,t1 - the court ordered new rulemaking, stating that
"certification by another agency . . . that its own environmental
standards are satisfied involves an entirely different kind of judg-
ment."'I " The court in Calvert Cliffs, faced with regulations similar
to those in Kalur, observed that a certifying agency makes no attempt
to balance environmental costs against opposing benefits."14 "The
only agency in a position to make such a judgment is the agency
with overall responsibility for the proposed federal action-the agency
to which NEPA is specifically directed." 1"5
109. Id. at 879
110. Id. at 878. But see Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas.
1971), where the court held that the Forest Service was justified in its reliance
upon an applicant's environmental studies due to, inter alia, "the high quality of
its research project. . . ." Id. at 127.
111. Army Corps of Eng'rs Regs., 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.131(d)(8)-(10) (1972),
provide that the Corps will accept the findings, determinations and interpretations
of the Regional Representative of the EPA concerning the applicability of water
quality considerations upon requests for permits to dump refuse into navigable
waters, even if there is disagreement between the Secretary of the Army and the
EPA; AEG Regs., 10 C.F.R. § 50.1 (1971), state that the AEC will defer to
water quality standards devised by state agencies under authority of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1171 (1970).
112. 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
113. Id. at 14.
114. 449 F.2d at 1123.
115. Id. Consider in this context that NEPA requires agencies with primary
responsibility to consult other agencies having special expertise in the field. 42
U.S.C. 4332(2) (C) (v) (1970). There has been considerable concern regarding
the effect that Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1971), might have on the
Refuse Act Permit Program (based on the 1899 Refuse Act and established by
President Nixon on December 23, 1970). In a letter to members of Congress, 2
ENVIRONMENT RPTR., CURRENT DEv. No. 2, at 1247 (1972), CEQ chairman, Mr.
Train, and EPA head, Mr. Ruckelshaus, explained that, under the program, over
20,000 applications for permits have been reviewed. Permits when issued will in
every case contain conditions which limit and control the pollution discharges in
accordance with applicable water quality standards. However, under the Kalur
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IV. AGENCY PROCEDURES TO IMPLEMENT NEPA
AND THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued Interim
Guidelines-6 on April 30, 1970 and revised Guidelines117 on January
25, 1971, for the preparation of detailed statements. Although the
Guidelines do not have the force of law, they have persuasive value.1 18
For this reason, the Guidelines make no attempt at furnishing en-
forcement methodsl9 nor do they categorically mandate that agencies
follow a specific procedure, but rather are couched in terms of what
agencies should consider. The CEQ has correctly recognized that
federal agencies have vastly differing functions and programs.1 20
Thus, federal agencies whose programs are generally carried out by
state and local governments (e.g., HUD) will require entirely differ-
ent and more sophisticated regulations than will agencies which have
direct program implementation.121 It should, therefore, come as no
surprise that the procedures promulgated by the agencies show a wide
range of variation 22 in approaching implementation, both from the
decision, the ultimate balancing decision must be made by the Corps of Engineers
rather than the EPA. Messrs. Train and Ruckelshaus argued that
[i]t is important that the primary Federal regulatory responsibility for con-
trolling and abating water pollution should be centralized in the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, rather than judicially forced into a system of divided
authority and responsibility. . ..
If the NEPA procedure is required to be followed in the case of each of the
approximately 20,000 permits to be issued, there is a serious question as to
whether the permit program would be administratively feasible.
Id. In this context, see CEQ Guidelines, § 5(d), 36 Fed. Reg. 1399 (1971),
which provides that "environmental protective regulatory activities concurred in
or taken by the EPA" will not require preparation of a section 102 statement. Id.
116. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970). See also Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. §
104 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
117. 36 Fed. Reg. 1398 (1971).
118. See generally Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 391 (1971) and cases
cited therein.
119. Neither NEPA nor the Guidelines furnish any means of assuring that sec-
tion 102 statements will be submitted. See 3 Environment Rptr., Current Decisions
No. 20, at 553-56, 781 (1972). See also Yost, supra note 2, at 88.
120. See Hearings on the First Annual Environmental Quality Report Before
the Sen. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
121. Id. Many agencies which administer large programs may have staff and
funding problems with respect to the necessity of routine filing of statements.
122. Compare General Services Admin. Regs., 36 Fed. Reg. 23,702 (1971),
which take a rather exclusionary approach with HEW Regs., 36 Fed. Reg. 23,676
(1971), which encourage a more positive and energetic role for HEW.
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perspective of agency attitude - 3 and the care taken in preparation of
their procedures. Nevertheless, courts have sought to insure that the
section 102 mandates are fully compiled with, and thus, have laid
down their own minimum requirements for agency procedures. This
judicial concern, manifested in several recent cases, may have the
effect of rendering nugatory many current agency regulations.
A. Time for Preparation of Section 102 Statements
Assuming for the moment that a federal agency is required to file
an environmental impact statement,124 a preliminary question arises
concerning when it must do so. NEPA does not speak directly to this
issue, providing only that the detailed statement "shall accompany
the proposal through the existing agency review processes."' 25 The
Interim Guidelines were not much clearer, stating that a section 102
statement would be necessary "[b]efore undertaking major action or
recommending or making a favorable report on legislation ....
The new Guidelines, however, state more definitely that filing of a
detailed statement will be required "[a]s early as possible and in all
cases prior to agency decision .. . .,127 Discussing the new Guidelines,
CEQ Chairman Train has suggested that a section 102 statement must
be prepared and circulated for comment early enough to affect the
decision-making process.12 8
Agency regulations are generally of no aid in determining when an
environmental impact statement must be filed. Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) regulations provide for preparation "at the earliest
practicable point in time," -121 while USDA procedures call for prepa-
123. Indicative of agency attitude is their statements of purpose in promulgat-
ing regulations. It is interesting to note how the agency views its duties and how
it perceives the objectives and the results of complying procedurally with NEPA.
Other indicators of agency attitude may be found in the degree to which the
public is encouraged to partake in environmental analysis. See, e.g., Forest Serv-
ice Regs., 36 Fed. Reg. 23,672 (1971) (that draft environmental statements are
to be the basis for encouraging public action); HEW Regs., 36 Fed. Reg. 23,676
(1971) (encourage press releases on environmental matters).
124. See notes 133-38 infra and accompanying text.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1970).
126. CEQ Interim Guidelines § 2, 35 Fed. Reg. 7391 (1970).
127. CEQ Guidelines § 2, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
128, See Hearings on the First Annual Environmental Quality Report Before
the Sen. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, supra note 120, at 9.
129. 36 Fed. Reg. 23,679, 23,680 (1971).
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ration and circulation "early enough in the agency review process...
to permit meaningful consideration . . . ."10 Other agencies, however,
have been more specific. The Federal Highway Commission, for
example, provides that draft statements "shall be prepared . . . and
circulated for comment during the location study,""13 and the ICC
now requires section 102 statements for all initial papers filed.1a2
The courts have held, at the least, that draft statements must be
prepared and circulated for comment before official decision."33 In
Greene County, the Federal Power Commission argued that a section
102 statement was not required until the agency made its final deci-
sion; plaintiffs contended that a statement must be filed prior to any
formal hearings. The claims of both parties were rejected by the
court which designated the applicable point in time for filing the
statement as any time prior to initial decision by the Presiding Ex-
130. Id. at 23,687, 23,668.
131. Id. at 23,696, 23,698. This newly promulgated regulation appears to settle
the problem raised in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal.
1971), which considered whether NEPA becomes applicable to a highway project
upon location approval, construction approval or at some intermediate point when
federal participation is assured. Defendants claimed that NEPA becomes applica-
ble only when the state actively seeks federal funds, conceding, however, that a
project becomes part of the federal-aid-highway system upon location approval.
Plaintiffs contended that NEPA applies when it is "highly likely" that the state
will seek federal funds. The court held that NEPA becomes applicable upon loca-
tion approval. Similarly, in Northeast Area Welfare Rights v. Volpe, 2 ERC 1704
(E.D. Wash. 1971), the court denied a preliminary injunction on a freeway proj-
ect, stating that NEPA was not yet applicable to the project:
* * * it is clear that at this time the [project] is proceeding with state funds
only; that no final approval has been sought from the Department of Trans-
portation for this project and that there is no immediate plan to seek federal
financial participation in this project. The only evidence of any federal
participation at this time is the fact that the Federal Government has fi-
nanced the [study] ....
Id. at 1705. In Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971), the court re-
jected defendant's contention that an impact statement was not required until the
final highway approval stage, reasoning that "it could well be too late to adjust
the formulated plans so as to minimize adverse environmental effects." Id. at
1121. In addition, the court noted that in the later stage the flexibility in con-
sidering alternatives have been lost. Id. In Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v.
Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132, 144 (N.D. Ga. 1971), the court held that the "ap-
proval event" is clearly the most appropriate time to consider environmental im-
pact.
132. ICC Regs. Implementing NEPA, 3 ERC 1650 (1972).
133. Lathan v. Volpe, 445 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); La Raza Unida v.
Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v.
Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Northeast Area Welfare Rights v.
Volpe, 2 ERO 1704 (E.D. Wash. 1971).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1973/iss1/9
NEPA
aminer.1 4 The case of Upper Pecos v. Stans,'35 questioned when a
statement need be filed where two or more agencies are involved in a
single project. In Upper Pecos, a grant offer was made by the Eco-
nomic Development Administration (EDA) to construct a road, and
the offer was accepted by the county commissioners. No impact state-
ment was filed by the EDA. However, the Forest Service, the agency
responsible for approval of location and construction plans, filed a
statement some time later. Plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service
statement was a meaningless gesture after EDA made the decision to
offer the grant. The court disagreed, stating that "the project must
be of sufficient definiteness before an evaluation of its environmental
impact can be made and alternatives proposed. 136 Judge Murrah
dissented, reasoning that Calvert Cliffs required that environmental
issues should be considered at every important stage in the decision-
making process; and, it did not appear that EDA had ever considered
the environmental consequences of its action. 3 Whatever legal con-
sequences Upper Pecos and Greene County may have, the practical
result has been for agencies to go beyond judicial standards and self-
impose filing requirements at very early stages. 138
B. Major Federal Actions
Of course NEPA does not require section 102 statements for every
agency action, rather, only for those "major Federal actions signif-
icantly affecting the quality of the human environment."'' 39 However,
as Chairman Train has observed, "[y]ou cannot define how significant
is significant, or how big is major, or how substantial is substantial.
These are qualitative, subjective terms that do not lend themselves
to legal definition."40 Nevertheless, the CEQ has attempted to list
criteria for the definition of "[a]ctions"''1 and further provides that
this statutory clause
134. 455 F.2d at 422.
135. 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971).
136. Id. at 1237.
137. Id. (dissenting opinion).
138. See, e.g., notes 130, 131 supra.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 4322(2)(C) (1970).
140. Hearings on the Administration of the National Environmental Policy Act
Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, supra note 27, at 64.
141. See CEQ Guidelines § 5(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
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. . . is to be construed by agencies with a view to the overall,
cumulative impact of the action proposed (and of further actions
contemplated). Such actions may be localized in their impact,
but if there is potential that the environment may be signif-
icantly affected, the statement is to be prepared. Proposed ac-
tions the environmental impact of which is likely to be higly
controversial should be covered in all cases. . . . [A gencies
should bear in mind that the effect of many Federal decisions
about a project or complex of projects can be individually lim-
ited but cumulatively considerable."42
Because of the variety of federal actions, agencies have approached
the delineation of "major federal action" in a number of ways. Some
agencies with extremely broad functions have deferred to the general
inclusiveness of the CEQ Guidelines, 43 while other agencies with
equally broad functions have gone one step farther and have made
the decision to resolve all doubts in favor of discussion of impact.144
Agencies with narrower functions, however, have recognized that pro-
cedural regulations lend themselves more readily to particularization
and have attempted to do so. The Forest Service, for example, has
taken the position that the responsible official must use good judg-
ment in determining when an impact statement is necessary, and has
provided him with eight categories of possible ecological effects, as
well as, a non-inclusive listing of ecological situations which may be
affected."4 HEW has gone even farther than the Forest Service, pro-
viding that
[t]he major determinate ... is the significance of the ... poten-
tial effect ... on the community, including compatibility of the
... use with the... environment .... The dollar and physical
size of the project should not be the sole criteria for determining
whether an environmental impact statement is required .... 140
The procedures then list many points of comparison between the
proposed project and its ecological effect."47
142. Id. § 5(b).
143. See, e.g., General Services Adrmin. Regs., 36 Fed. Reg. 23,702 (1971).
144. See, e.g., USDA Regs., 36 Fed. Reg. 23,667 (1971).
145. Forest Service Regs. § 1942.2, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,671 (1971).
146. HEW Regs. § 20-15-40(A), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,677 (1971).
147. Id. This approach is also taken by DOT, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,679 (1971);
and the Federal Highway Admin., 36 Fed. Reg. 23,696 (1971).
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Courts have recognized the necessity for agency expertise in decid-
ing whether an action is "major" and whether it "significantly affects
the quality of the human environment," and will generally overturn
an agency decision only if it is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of
agency discretion.1 48 But, in Scherr v. Volpe,49 the court rejected this
view on the basis that NEPA is a flat command to federal agencies.
Thus, agencies must have the first determination to decide what is
expected of them. "However, when its failure is then challenged, it
is the court which must construe the statutory standards . . . and,
having construed them, then apply them to the particular proj-
ect . . . ...0 In Goose Hollow, the court looked behind HUD's de-
termination that the construction of a 16-story apartment building
(admittedly a "major action") would not have a "significant effect"
upon the human environment; and, held that the methods employed
in gathering the environmental information, used to determine that
there would be no "significant effect," were infirm.15 ' Finally, in Izaak
Walton League v. Schlesinger,' 2 the court has cast some doubts as to
the efficacy and propriety of rigid classification or "threshold" meth-
ods, concluding, on the facts, that Atomic Energy Commission regu-
lations which did not require preparation of detailed statements
prior to the issuance or denial of a partial 50 per cent operating
license are invalid.,3
C. Contents of the Impact Statement
NEPA requires only that a detailed statement be prepared and cir-
culated prior to decision-making. However the CEQ, in order to in-
148. See Echo Park v. Romney, 3 ERG 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971); where the
court upheld a HUD determination that an environmental impact statement was
not required in connection with a 66-unit apartment complex.
149. 336 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
150. Id. at 888.
151. 334 F. Supp. at 886.
152. 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.G. 1971).
153. Id. at 294. A related problem to "quantifying" actions so as to exempt
potential major actions falling out of the classifications, is the practice of "frag-
matization." See Conservation Soc'y v. Texas, 2 ERG 1871 (5th Cir. 1971)
(sections of a proposed highway were considered separately), and Wilderness
Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970) (first draft environmental state-
ment by the Department of the Interior never mentioned the Trans-Alaska Pipe-
line, but only the service road). Thus, if these attempts to break up the projects
into smaller "digestible parts" had succeeded, there may never have been environ-
mental considerations of the projects in toto.
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sure that the comments of other agencies will be valuable inputs, has
provided for the mechanism of a "draft statement."''5  The five cate-
goriesL55 of environmental impact (to be discussed later), set out in
the Act, represent the format adopted by the Guidelinesli and most
agencies. 15 7 Agency procedures vary widely as to the scope of objec-
tivity required. HEW requires, for example, that the impact state-
ment be ". . . written in a narrative form. Each item should be
discussed in sufficient detail to permit a reviewer to arrive at an inde-
pendent judgment . *."..",158 while, in marked contrast, the DOT re-
quires only that the five categories "be covered in the statement."1 D
1. Adequate Discussion of Alternatives
Possibly the greatest problem area with respect to the scope of con-
tent is the requirement of including alternatives in the detailed state-
ment. Does this requirement mean that an agency must simply list
other possibilities or does it go farther and require the agency to con-
sider fully the environmental impact of each alternative? How many
alternatives must be included? Agency procedures have generally
required more than a mere listing, but they have differed greatly
with respect to the scope of analysis.160 DOT provides that "[a]lterna-
tive actions.., should be set forth and analyzed ... .",161 and USDA
states that "alternative actions ... should be explored . . . and . ..
evaluated .... ",162 while the Forest Service has taken an initiative in
requiring alternatives to be described and the analysis presented,
including costs and impact on the environment. Furthermore,
"[c]reativity is required in recognizing and developing alternatives",
and a range of alternative means has been set out.163
154. Letter from Russell E. Train, Chairman, CEQ, to Senator H. Jackson
and Rep. Dingell, Chairman, Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation,
reprinted in 1 ENVIRONMENT RPTR., CURRENT Dav. No. 31, at 802-04 (1970).
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (1970).
156. CEQ Guidelines § 7, 36 Fed. Reg. 7725 (1971).
157. See, e.g., HEW Regs. § 20-15-50(A), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,676-78 (1971);
REA Regs., § VI(A), 36 Fed. Reg. 1000 (1971).
158. HEW Regs. § 20-15-50(B), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,678 (1971).
159. DOT Regs. § 8(0), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,681 (1971).
160. Compare DOT Regs. § 8(0) (4), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,681 (1971) with Forest
Service Regs. § 1942.2(V), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,671 (1971).
161. DOT Regs. § 8(0)(4), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,681 (1971).
162. USDA Regs., 36 Fed. Reg. 23,667 (1971).
163. Forest Service Regs. § 1942.2(V), 36 Fed. Reg. 23,671 (1971).
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The leading case setting the minimum limits for discussion of alter-
natives is Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton (NRDC). 34
In NRDC, the Department of Interior filed a somewhat lengthy and
considerably detailed section 102 statement concerning proposed off-
shore oil leases. However, the statement failed to adequately discuss
alternatives and their environmental impact. The court held the
statement inadequate, stating that NEPA
... requires a presentation of the environmental risks incident to
reasonable alternative courses of action. The agency may limit
its discussion of environmental impact to a brief statement, when
that is the case, that the alternative course involves no effect on
the environment, or that their effect, briefly described, is simply
not significant. A rule of reason is implicit in this aspect of the
law . .. 5
Federal agencies, however, are limited in their "courses of action"
by law. Recognizing this pragmatic consideration, an interesting
question arises as to whether or not an agency must consider alter-
natives which it has no authority to implement. The court in NRDC
confronted this problem by limiting the alternative requirement to a
construction of reasonableness,'3 suggesting that "reference may of
course be made to studies of other agencies-including other impact
statements. Nor is it appropriate ... to disregard alternatives merely
because they do not offer a complete solution to the problem."' 67 The
dissent, however, argued that the range of alternatives to be dis-
cussed should be limited to realistic alternatives that will reasonably
be available within the period prior to decision-making. 63 But, the
dissent fails to recognize the value of alternative actions in the de-
cision-making process. Consideration of a specific alternative, albeit
not within the scope of authority of the lead agency, may well be the
deciding factor in determining not to go ahead with the proposed
action. The effect of NRDC is to place a heavy burden on all agencies
to consider all viable and reasonable alternatives before ruling them
out.', ,,
164. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
165. Id. at 834.
166, Id. at 837. ". . . the discussion of environmental effects of alternatives
need not be exhaustive. What is required is information sufficient to permit a
reasoned choice of alternatives . I..." Id. at 836.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 839 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
169, But see Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C.
1972).
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2. Consideration of Comments
Another important difficulty arises with respect to when and to
whom the draft statement must be circulated for comment. The Act
provides that comments must be obtained "[p]rior to making any de-
tailed statement ...."-170 The CEQ has interpreted this language to
mean that comment must be obtained prior to the final statement,
but after the draft statement is prepared. 171 "The principle to be
applied is to obtain views of other agencies at the earliest feasible
time in the development of program and project proposals."'172 Courts
have held that all comments, positive or negative, must be included
in the final statement if they have been received from any agency
which has "jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved." 173 Yet, the courts are split as to
what public comments need be included. One court has required
that all environmental impacts should be included which the public
alleges, even if the agency finds them to be without merit.Y4 "Then,
if the decision-makers choose to ignore such factors, they will be doing
so with their eyes wide open."'7 5 Another court has concluded, how-
ever, that only "responsible opposing views need be included and
hence there is room for discretion on the part of the officials preparing
the statement . .. ."76
The net effect of court decisions on agency procedure and, in turn,
the net effect of agency procedures on the proper implementation of
NEPA, cannot yet be fully realized. The cases have only begun to
touch on many of the important implications that agency procedure
may exert on agency policy. As long as the courts continue to con-
sider primarily the nature of the Act, and apply general principles
consistent with NEPA's spirit to the situation at hand, they will con-
tinue to carve out necessary implementing procedures.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1970).
171. CEQ Guidelines § 8, 36 Fed. Reg. 1399 (1971).
172. Id. § 9.
173. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 786 n.10
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
174. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D.
Ark. 1971).
175. Id. at 759.
176. 463 F.2d at 788.
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D. The Role oj Courts and Agencies in Implementing NEPA
Professor Louis Jaffe has suggested that it may prove futile to allo-
cate roles to the agencies or the courts without first analyzing the jobs
to be done by each. 7 The advantages and handicaps inherent in
these institutions must be understood fully in order to maximize
their usefulness in environmental control.
1. The Nature of the Administrative Agency
Whether or not agencies are "captives" of those interests which
they purport to regulate is a question which has been hotly debated
ior generations by students of public administration. Professor Jaffe
neither fully agrees nor disagrees with the absolutists on either end,
but does concede that administrative bodies tend to develop a "sym-
biosis" with those they regulate. "This characteristically comes about
over a period of time in which the initial impulses behind the en-
abling legislation have worked themselves out and have lost their
urgency."178 Professor Jaffe points out that the defect in the so-called
.capture theory" is that it is essentially based on a Marxian analysis
of social forces which assumes that finance and industry run the
country.170 If Professor Jaffe's view is correct, then agencies must be
assessed individually in order to establish the extent of "symbiosis."
From a different perspective, one author suggests that administra-
tive officers operate under a type of "profit motive" (analogous to the
motivating force behind private business organizations) whereby
government officials generally must seek to maximize the power of
their positions. 80 Institutional survival is the ultimate goal, so the
theory goes, and accompanying it is a tendency toward conservatism
and inflexibility. "Adaptation, innovation and creation all involve
risks of failure, with attendant discredit or disgrace as well as possible
threat to job security."18' This instinct for survival which gravitates
toward the status quo is further accentuated by the manifestation of
177. Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 BuFFAo
L. REv. 231 (1970).
178. Jaffe, Book Review, 84 -IARv. L. REv. 1562, 1565 (1971).
179. Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, supra note
177, at 232. "A quick inventory of the agencies and departmental bureaus reveals
the naivete of this assumption." Id. Professor Jaffe cites, for example, the SEC's
history of investor protection.
180. Loevinger, The Sociology of Bureaucracy, 24 Bus. LAw. 7, 10 (1968).
181. Id. at 11.
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bureaucratic specialization which, as one commentator has observed,
leads to parochialism, which in turn characteristically leads to exces-
sive preoccupation with its own goals and its own vision of the public
interest with an accompanying disproportionate sacrifice of other
social goals and interests. 8 2
It is, therefore, essential that the new national environmental pol-
icy be viewed against the background of agency sociology. In the
past, agencies have evolved policies, procedures, programs, philoso-
phies and clientele which have limited their responsiveness to any
broad environmental policy.183 Confronted, however, with the legisla-
tive mandates of NEPA, agencies are forced into the position of pol-
icy change. In this context, Professor Henning has observed that
"[a]lthough outward conformance and change [in] . . . policy is re-
quired, this does not necessarily mean past policies will not still play
a key role in the actual direction of the agency."18 4
2. Nature of the Decision-making Process
Any attempt to superimpose an environmental policy over existing
agency structure must encounter difficulties. The planning process,
of course, is almost always a continuous process. Often federal pro-
grams undergo years of study with many "decisions" made informally
or on an ad hoc basis, giving rise to an "insider's perspective."' 8
Professor Reich has observed that most agency planning is done on
the basis of balancing competing interests, an unsatisfactory basis
which equates policy-making with satisfying the majority.18 He
points out that as agencies make decisions based on a harmonizing of
many competing interests in a given situation, they begin to evolve a
meaning for their decision-making couched in terms of objectivity.187
Herein lies the central myth of administrative law: "the belief that
decisions concerning planning and allocation can be, and are, made
on an objective basis."'18  Professor Reich's views are further illus-
182. Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Government Planning, 35 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 329 (1966).
183. Henning, supra note 46, at 452-53.
184. Id. at 453. See generally J. SAx, supra note 57.
185. See generally Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1228
(1966).
186. Id. at 1234.




trated by Professor Sax who has noted that agency "sub-optimizing,"
(essentially a balancing process) will frequently lead to a "nibbling
phenomenon," in which large resource values are "gradually eroded,
case by case, as one development after another is allowed."'' 89
Because there is always some constraint and limitation on agency
resources and funds, agencies must seek to balance only those interests
which can give rise to those objectives which are immediately attain-
able.10 Moreover, any agency decision must be guided by the qualify-
ing factor of feasibility. This principle may serve to explain much of
the agency torpidity observed in complying with NEPA, such as the
sparsity of impact statements filed, fragmatization of programs into
more digestible parts, consideration of a minimum of alternatives and
attempts to place much of the effort of gathering environmental im-
pacts on the applicants or the public.' 9' As Victor A. Thompson has
pointedly remarked:
It is understandable that the . . . [agency] should wish to avoid
implementing such a policy. Should . . . [it] nevertheless be re-
quired to do so . . . [it] can be expected to shift as much of the
cost to the clientele as . . . [it] can. The public presentation of
a program will be couched in terms of its ideal policy goals,
but the actual performance will also be governed by considera-
tions of administrative feasibility (least effort). Thus, there is
always a gap, more or less wide, between the ideal and the actual,
between the administrative self-presentation and the administra-
tive reality.192
3. The Dual Role of the Courts
Judge J. Skelley Wright, writing for the court in Calvert Cliffs,
suggested that it is too early for the courts to realize their proper role
for the implementation of NEPA: "it remains to be seen whether
the promise of this legislation will become a reality. Therein lies the
189. J. SAx, supra note 57, at 55. "The danger is that in each little dispute-
when the pressure is on-the balance of judgment will move ever so slightly to
resolve doubts in favor of those with a big economic stake in development and
with powerful allies." Id.
190. See generally Hearings on the Administration of the National Environment
Policy Act Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, supra note 27, at 64.
191. V. THoMPsoN, Bureaucracy in a Democratic Society, in PUBLIC ADMIN.
AND DuMocRAcy 205 (R. Martin ed. 1965).
192. Id. at 215-16.
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judicial role."1s But, it is now the time for the courts to resolve how
this legislation can become a reality. The context in which the courts
must fashion their role must be in terms of the nature of the policy to
be implemented (NEPA) and the nature of the implementing instru-
ments (federal administrative agencies). The general view of com-
mentators is that the courts should have a role as "coordinate law-
makers,"19, to fill interstitially or otherwise effectuate statutory pat-
terns enacted by the legislature. 95 But NEPA has been considered
only as a policy mandating reform in the procedures of decision-
making, not a policy aimed directly to the substance of the decision.190
Therefore, without a dear "substance policy," the courts must remain
"coordinate lawmakers" on the plane of agency procedure. This view
is further buttressed by the lack of defined environmental goals. As
Professor Mandelker has stated, "[e]ffective judicial intervention in
social controversy requires a consensus on the goals and objectives of
social change, at a time in history when it is our failure as a society
to agree on the goals and objectives of social change .. .
V. CONCLUSION
Generalities are frequently inaccurate. Generalities within the law
are often dangerous. With extreme caution, then, it may be said that
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 has achieved some
degree of success; with equal precept it may also be said that NEPA
has suffered some degree of failure. The extent of success or failure
cannot fully yet be assessed without a complete understanding of the
task NEPA is to perform. NEPA's success has been attained primarily
as each agency has begun to consider environmental factors in their
decision-making. NEPA's failure, inherent in its nature and fostered
by attitudes inherent in public administration, is dramatically evi-
dent when one considers that planning and decision-making are still
grounded basically in an ad hoc framework.
193. 449 F.2d at 1111.
194. Coleman, supra note 2, at 647.
195. See generally Mishkln, The Variousness of "Federal Law:" Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 797 (1957).
196. See notes 32-37 supra and accompanying text.
197. See Mandelker, The Role of Law in Social Change, 8 0SGOODE HALL L.J.
355 (1970). In this context, see also Grier, The Role of the Court in Protecting
the Environment--A jurisprudential Analysis, 23 S. CALM. L. Rnv. 93 (1971).
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This note has attempted a preliminary survey of an extremely far-
reaching piece of legislation. The drafters intended NEPA to be a
firm, but fluid, statement. As the courts become more willing to
involve judicial machinery with the problems of the environment,
NEPA may become a significant tool. Environmental groups, too, are
becoming highly successful inputs into the process of defining what
projects should be considered under the policies of NEPA. With in-
volvement from all sections of American society, NEPA may well
become an effective device for solving problems in the urban environ-
ment.
Important areas of NEPA which are ripe for resolution include the
retroactivity issue and the scope of required alternatives. There are
several amendments to the Act pending in Congress which will basi-
cally serve to weaken many of the judicial interpretations. NEPA is
becoming persuasive evidence of congressional intent in many fields,
such as highway relocation. Yet, with the many positive aspects of
NEPA's development, the Act can never achieve full success unless
courts, agencies and the private sector work together to define prac-
ticable means to implement NEPA's requirements.
NEPA, as it exists today, is not "the answer." But whatever its
major failings, it is interesting to reflect that such an Act could ever
become the law of the land with the extent of societal polarization on
the issues and the lack of any real environmental goals within our
society.
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